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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Birch, the insured, must be "made whole" before Fire Insurance, the insurer, can keep a third-
party recovery. This means Birch should be reimbursed for his entire deductible, not just a portion 
of it. Further, the full measure of damages for damage to realty is replacement cost. The trial court 
arbitrarily accepted the insurer's use of 5% "depreciation" to "nick" Birch for 5% of his deductible. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
FIRE INSURANCE CONCEDES THAT IT DID NOT RELY UPON ANY TORT RECOVERY 
AMOUNT TO CAP THE SUBROGATION RECOVERY IT OWED TO BIRCH 
Fire Insurance now concedes the obvious. The Fire Insurance adjuster who kept 5% of 
Birch's deductible never offered the theory that Birch's subrogation recovery was capped by the "tort 
recovery" amount. This was a theory concocted by counsel for Fire Insurance after litigation. The 
actual numbers simply don't reflect that argument. Farmers now concedes that if Birch was only 
entitled to keep 95% of the replacement cost of the fence and landscaping, that would have been 95% 
of $7,732.91 (the replacement or restoration cost). That full tort recovery amount is $7,346.26. 
According to Fire Insurance's briefs, anything above that amount would be a double recovery to 
Birch, to which he would not be entitled. However, the adjuster gave Birch the full amount of 
replacement, $7,732.91, less his deductible of $500.00, or $7,232.91. Then, Birch got 95% of his 
$500.00 deductible from the subrogation recovery, or $475.00. So Birch actually ended up with 
$7,707.91, not $7,346.26. The Fire Insurance adjusters obviously never understood Birch's 
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subrogation to be capped at 95% of the replacement cost. They simply pro-rated everything. This is 
clear evidence that Fire Insurance has an indiscriminate practice of pro-rating subrogation recoveries, 
not applying some "tort recovery" cap on subrogation. Other insureds are undoubtedly losing a "pro-
rata" share of their recovery, despite not being made whole on any theory of third party recovery. 
But the fact that the tort recovery fell short of the amount insured is irrelevant. Birch paid a 
premium for insurance that carried a contractually specified measure of recovery, i.e., replacement 
cost. In other words, as between Birch and Fire Insurance, the contract set the maximum measure 
of the loss, as a matter of contract, not tort. Birch bargained for complete indemnity up to that limit, 
not indemnity up to the measure of tort recovery against some unknown third party. Fire Insurance 
all but concedes this point, in admitting that "in appropriate circumstances, that would entitle him 
[Birch] to be made more than whole, based upon the contract rather than the law of subrogation". 
(Fire Ins. Brief, p. 10). Why that reasoning would not apply here is left unanswered. 
B 
UTAH IS A PRETTY, GREAT STATE 
Fire Insurance may be a nationwide company, and so subject to varying rules in different 
states regarding whether the insured or insurer bears the loss of an incomplete recovery in tort. Fire 
Insurance cites cases from its favorite jurisdictions, which apparently include Iowa and New 
Hampshire. However, Birch believes that Utah is a pretty, great state. That is why he lives here, and 
not in Iowa or New Hampshire. Utah law is amply adequate to answer the questions raised in this 
case. And Fire Insurance finds no Utah case law to back it up, ignoring the fact that no Utah case has 
created a special rule for this situation where, coincidentally, the contractual measure of recovery is 
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not identical to the tort measure of recovery. 
But even if we look at other states, Fire Insurance isn't necessarily given preferential 
treatment. For instance, Fire Insurance argues the case based upon the law of New Hampshire, which 
Fire Insurance claims adopts a pro-rata rule in "reduced settlement" cases.1 Utah is, on the other 
hand, an "insured-first" state. But the Dimick v. Lewis rule was later clarified to apply to the rather 
unique situation of a parent recovering as an additional plaintiff, for medical expenses, from which 
subrogation would be allowed, combining with a recovery for a child, as a separate claim not 
including medical expenses, from which subrogation would not be allowed. The Dimick court 
required that the single recovery be differentiated between the parent's claim and the child's claim, 
and subrogation allowed from the parent's claim only. See Roy v. Ducneuigeen, 532 A.2d 1388 
(1987); Lutkus v. Lutkus, 1997.NH.2, for further application of the Dimick rule in cases of minor's 
settlements versus subrogation by parent's health insurer. It is not clear that Dimick applies pro-rata 
subrogation outside of unique circumstance of a parent's tort claim for injury to a child. See Wolters 
v. American Rep. Ins. Co., 2003 NH.0000084, " . . . subrogation is generally not allowed where the 
insured's total recovery is less than the insured's total loss [citing Dimick]". 
C 
THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE DOES NOT HELP FIRE INSURANCE 
Fire Insurance continues to trot out the "common fund" doctrine. But Fire Insurance incurred 
no attorney fees or other costs to be taxed from the fund before distributing the proceeds. And that 
dimick v. Lewis, 497 A.2d 1221 (1985)("we are reluctant to apply either an insured-first 
or an insurer-first rule"). 
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isn't even the point; the question is who gets the money after any costs and attorney fees are taxed 
to the fund. Even if Fire Insurance is entitled to deduct the "cost of producing the fund" from the 
recovery from the tort-feasor,2 the next $500.00 after collection costs should have gone to Birch. The 
relationship between the parties is not a joint venture in collections; it is not a business partnership 
with equal obligations; it is not a marriage with equal division of property. The rules are clear: the 
insured comes first. Once the insured is made whole, then the insurer gets to keep recovery. Fire 
Insurance should have kept all but $500.00. Birch would then have been made whole. On the other 
hand, if Birch had to go to the bother of suit, and settled for the same amount as Fire Insurance did, 
under the authorities cited, the third-party recovery would have been taxed for costs (including 
attorney fees) and Birch would then have gotten the next $500.00. Then, and only then, would Fire 
Insurance have gotten the rest. While Fire Insurance came out ahead by handling subrogation on its 
own, that did not entitle it to ignore the priority of the insured in keeping the recovery. Fire Insurance 
has produced NO policy language allowing it to give priority to itself in disbursing any recovery, and 
NO policy language allowing allocation, and NO policy language allowing it to assess "collection" 
costs ahead of making its insured whole. 
This is what happens on the flip side, when the insured carries the ball and obtains a 
recovery. After the attorney fees and costs are taxed against the fund, THEN the party entitled to 
priority gets all the money, until they are made whole. See Anderson v. UPS, 2004 UT 57, P.3d , 
where the insurer got all the money AFTER the fund was taxed for attorney fees and costs. 
2Birch does NOT agree with this assumption, but it is irrelevant to this case. 
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D 
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN ALLOCATION OF PROCEEDS 
Fire Insurance also attempts to slice the case up into two portions, an insured portion, and 
an uninsured portion, and to require an "allocation". But this case involves a single loss, which is 
damage to a fence and landscaping. All that the deductible does is limit Fire Insurance's payment, 
but does not change the loss into two losses, one insured and one not insured. If Birch had had his 
truck damaged, which was not insured by Fire Insurance, as well as a fence, which was insured, then 
we might be talking about an allocation issue. However, this case does not involve multiple losses.3 
Even if it did, the Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988) case clearly 
involved payments of both insured (property damage) losses and uninsured (bodily injury) losses. 
State Farm was denied recovery of any portion of the recovery against the third-party, which 
recovery extinguished both the bodily injury claims (which State Farm did not pay) and the property 
damage claims (which State Farm did pay) against the third-party. State Farm was not allowed to 
subrogate or to ALLOCATE the recovery in any way, and not allowed subrogation unless it could 
prove a double recovery. This would require finding that $50,000.00 fully compensated the parents 
for BOTH the damaged car AND the death of their child. Fire Insurance's argument is directly 
contrary to Hill. 
3Birch does not believe that this would make a difference under Utah subrogation law, but 
there is no need to press that question; it simply isn't present in this case arising from a single, 
insured item of damaged property. 
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E 
FIRE INSURANCE CONCEDES THAT REPLACEMENT COST 
IS THE TORT MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
The trial court's ruling was that Birch was only entitled to keep an amount equal to the 
recovery of damages in tort. The trial court simply assumed that it was undisputed that 95% of the 
cost of replacement or restoration equaled the full recovery of tort damages for destruction of fixtures 
and damage to realty, by application of a 5% discount for "depreciation". Birch pointed out that the 
tort measure of damages to realty is ordinarily the cost of repair or restoration. Marks v. Culmer, 6 
Utah 419, 24 P. 528, 531 (1890)("the property [a building] being of such a nature that it could be 
readily reproduced [i]ts value to the plaintiffs would be what it would cost to reproduce it, and the 
value of its use while that was being done").4 Fire Insurance basically concedes this point, by 
pointing to the additional authority of Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Fire 
Insurance offered no evidence below that would indicate that the diminution in the market value of 
Birch's property exceeded the cost of restoration. 
The short, simple rule is that the insured gets first-dollar from any third-party recovery, in 
the absence of statute or contract, until the insured has been fully compensated for his loss. Because 
the insured has contract and paid for complete indemnification, any risk of loss or shortfall is borne 
by the insurer. 
4Unlike automobiles, real estate (including landscaping and fences) do not necessarily 
depreciate once purchased. The usual belief is that landscaping and fences add value, and do not 
depreciate. Fire Insurance offered no evidence to support its claim for application of depreciation 
in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Fire Insurance cannot stand first in line in dividing up a third-party tort recovery. Fire 
Insurance and Birch do not stand together, to share pro rata, either. Birch stands first in line, and 
must be paid $500.00, his entire deductible, before Fire Insurance may keep any recovery. The 
assumption by Fire Insurance that it was entitled to a 5% discount for "depreciation" was not 
supported by any law or facts. The measure of damage for injury to realty is the reasonable cost of 
restoration. Fire Insurance was not entitled to create a new rule, nor was the trial court. This matter 
should be reversed and remanded for entry of partial summary judgment in Birch's favor. 
DATED THIS 22nd day of February, 2005. 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Kevin K. Robson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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